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The relationship between the processes of government established by
our Constitution and the substantive values underlying those processes
has been a subject of debate for many years. Scholars such as Burt
Neuborne and John Hart Ely have articulated process-based theories of
the Constitution that seek to avoid using the Constitution as interpreted
by the judiciary to resolve disputes over substantive values.1 Harold
Koh's excellent book, The National Security Constitution,2 is a prominent
addition to this rich tradition, extending the analysis to the foreign affairs
provisions of our Constitution.
In many respects, Professor Koh's book reminds me of John Hart
Ely's masterpiece, Democracy & Distrust.3 Koh's work, like Ely's, is an
ambitious project. Both books contain a breadth of vision and argument,
designed not merely to explain one particular event, case, or narrow area
of law, but to develop a theory to explain a fundamental problem of
American constitutional law.
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1. See Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United
States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 363 (1982); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST (1980). For other
examples of process-based constitutional theories, see the sources cited in Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 n.3 (1980).
2. H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFrER THE
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
3. J. ELY, supra note 1.
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Koh and Ely are both wonderful writers, able to capture complexity in
powerful and clear prose. Democracy & Distrust immediately exercised a
powerful influence on the debate over the role of the federal judiciary in
our society. Similarly, I believe that The National Security Constitution
is destined to play an important role in the constitutional debates over
foreign policy making in years to come.
4
Finally, Koh, as Ely, has developed a process-based theory of the Con-
stitution. While Ely sought to justify judicial review by means of a repre-
sentation-reinforcement model that allowed the courts to avoid
substantive value judgments, Koh views the National Security Constitu-
tion through a procedural lens. Both Ely's and Koh's theories require a
separation of substance from process, a separation which is both appeal-
ing, yet ultimately problematic.
Ely's process-based approach immediately sparked criticism among
legal scholars. Professor Tribe, for example, wrote of the puzzling persis-
tence of process-based theories of the Constitution, arguing that the sepa-
ration of process from substantive values was artificial. 5 Harold Koh's
wonderfully insightful book suffers from the same weakness. Koh makes
a major contribution to our understanding of the Iran-Contra affair by
treating it not as an isolated incident, but as one more example of the
breakdown of constitutional processes of governance over foreign policy.
This breakdown of constitutional process, however, fundamentally re-
flects our nation's deviation from the framers'. Republican values as to
how the new nation should conduct its policies with respect to the test of
the world. Executive dominance over the other branches of government
in the making of foreign policy is an outgrowth of our nation's effort to
dominate other (countries. Rejuvenating our constitutional processes re-
quires recharting the substantive course of American foreign policy. It
requires recasting our internationalism so that we become more multilat-
eral, co-operative and respectful of international law, and less militaristic
and interventionist. Fortunately, the ending of the Cold War has
brought the opportunity for rethinking old dogmas that pervade Ameri-
can foreign policy, distorting our constitutional values.
II. The Lessons of Iran-Contra
For Harold Koh, the Iran-Contra affair reflects an ongoing assault on
the National Security Constitution. The affair was "not just a passing
4. Professor Koh's work has already had an important impact on other commentators of
the Iran-Contra affair. See, ag., Draper, The Constitution in Danger, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs,
Mar. 1, 1990, at 43 n.19.
5. Tribe, supra note 1.
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historical aberration, but.., the latest act in a foreign policy drama."6
Although Koh uses the Iran-Contra affair as a starting point, his goal is
to utilize that unfortunate episode to illuminate a deeper problem -
"systemic flaws in our foreign policy-making process."7 The core notion
of the National Security Constitution is that the foreign affairs power of
the United States is constitutionally shared among the three branches of
government. 8 This principle, which Professor Koh terms "balanced in-
stitutional participation,"9 recurs throughout the book. It is precisely
this fundamental principle that the Iran-Contra players ignored, secretly
violated, and when confronted, challenged.
In its fact-laden search for the smoking gun, the congressional Iran-
Contra committees virtually ignored this basic problem and treated the
affair as an isolated incident. The Congress, Special Prosecutor, Tower
Commission and public all analogized the Iran-Contra affair to the
Watergate break-in and cover-up 15 years earlier. The more appropriate
analogy, according to Professor Koh, is Vietnam. Iran-Contra, like Viet-
nam, reflected not merely a particular lapse of executive truthfulness and
compliance with the law, but a consistent pattern of executive circum-
vention of legislative constraint in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It
is that pattern of history that the Iran-Contra investigators ignored and
that Professor Koh illuminates.
Koh's discussion of the pattern of history reflected in Iran-Contra ef-
fectively demonstrates the connection between a wide range of foreign
policy issues - treaty powers, war powers, international economic emer-
gency powers, covert action - that are too often dealt with separately.
While the framers of the Constitution had devised a careful balance be-
tween the branches in conducting foreign affairs, a pattern of executive
dominance developed during the post-World War II era, of which the
Vietnam War and Iran-Contra are simply two of the more visible
examples.
This executive dominance pervades all areas of foreign policy-making
and has proven to be relatively impervious to reform. For example,
while the framers provided that treaties would be a part of federal law
and therefore binding on the Executive, recent presidents have sought to
unilaterally modify, bend or simply violate U.S. treaty commitments.10
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tration turned to Congress when it sought to terminate our treaty obliga-
tions,11 modem Chief Executives exercise no such restraint.
12
Congress and the courts have declined to provide serious resistance to
unilateral executive action in foreign affairs. Congress, for example, took
no action when the Reagan Administration unilaterally modified our
commitment to jurisdiction in the World Court or when it unilaterally
terminated our Friendship and Commerce Treaty with Nicaragua.
13
Moreover, the Supreme Court refused to intervene to prevent the Carter
Administration from terminating the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan, a decision which the Reagan Administration read to confirm
executive power to terminate U.S. treaty commitments.
14
Similarly, modem Presidents have transgressed the clear constitutional
intent of the framers that Congress must first approve the offensive use of
force against another nation. Presidents in the post-World War II era
have repeatedly sent U.S. troops into combat abroad in Asia, Central
America and the Middle East without congressional approval. More-
over, post-World War II Chief Executives have articulated a constitu-
tional power to send U.S. armed forces into combat without
congressional approval whenever they detect threats to national security.
With the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, Presidents
have increasingly turned to covert paramilitary operations to accomplish
policy objectives that they could not achieve by overt military interven-
tion. They did so despite a constitutional framework requiring joint con-
gressional/executive agreement before such covert paramilitary
operations could be launched.' 5
Professor Koh also demonstrates a pattern of executive ascendancy in
addressing international economic emergencies. In this area, executive
dominance has occurred due to congressional delegation of broad statu-
tory authority, rather than executive assertion of unilateral constitutional
authority. From the 1950s to 1970s the Executive exercised broad emer-
11. See, eg., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 31, 1798), reprinted in
10 WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 41 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903) (all agree that legislature is
the only power that can control a treaty); Letter from Secretary of War James McHenry to
President Adams (Mar. 14, 1798), reprinted in THE ADAMS PAPERS (Part IV: Letters Re-
ceived and Other Loose Papers, Chronologically arranged, 1639 - 1889) (1958) (suspending the
treaties with France would "require the deliberation of Congress").
12. Pp. 43-45.
13. The one recent example of congressional opposition to an attempted executive modifi-
cation of a treaty occurred in the debate over the proper meaning of the ABM Treaty. See
Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1353-1540 (1989) (symposium dis-
cussing that debate).
14. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
15. See Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986).
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gency power under the Trading With The Enemy Act.16 In 1977, Con-
gress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), designed to narrow the President's emergency authority in
non-wartime situations. Nevertheless, the Executive has utilized IEEPA
to undertake economic warfare against nations such as Iran, Libya, Nica-
ragua, South Africa and Panama, despite the absence in most cases of a
true national emergency as required by the statute. 17 The judiciary has
regularly rebuffed challenges to Presidential uses of these broad emer-
gency powers. 8 Even worse, in INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court in-
validated the legislative veto provision that Congress had relied upon to
provide a check on executive action.' 9
Professor Koh does not merely demonstrate this pattern of increasing
executive dominance throughout the various arenas of foreign policy; he
also traces the process historically. In chapter three, he outlines the his-
torical process by which we have reached this unfortunate state of affairs.
That chapter analyzes the connection between America's position and
role in the world and our National Security Constitution. Our Constitu-
tion reflected a militarily weak and geographically isolated nation. The
framers concluded that the new republic's cautious and isolationist for-
eign policy would be best served by a constitutional framework that gave
Congress an important role in foreign policy.20
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the
United States turned toward globalism and international power. With
the extrusion of American power abroad, the limitations on Presidential
power, so carefully guarded by the early leaders of the Republic, began to
erode. The United States' assertive exercise of military power abroad,
the increasing use of executive agreements to bypass the treaty proce-
dure, and the unilateral executive use of force beyond merely protecting
American citizens contributed to the evisceration of the limitations on
executive power.
The process that started at the end of the nineteenth century
culminated after World War II. Every challenge to United States he-
gemony anywhere in the world began to be perceived as a threat to na-
16. Pp. 46-47.
17. See Lobel, Emergency Power and The Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1415
(1989).
18. Pp. 47-48.
19. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
20. While Presidents certainly took the lead in foreign affairs,"and took actions that some-
times exceeded the constitutionality permissible, "our first Presidents were overtly deferential
to Congress" and never claimed to have "inherent" power to initiate military actions. A.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 378-79 (1976).
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tional security. In a process culminating with the Vietnam War, the
Presidency overwhelmed the other branches and asserted virtually un-
limited power over the conduct of foreign affairs.
Congress responded, during the post-Vietnam reform movement, by
enacting various statutes designed to curb executive dominance in for-
eign affairs. The War Powers Resolution, IEEPA, and the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment (requiring executive notice to Congress of anticipated covert
activities) all attempted to reinvolve Congress in the nation's foreign pol-
icy. In a devastating critique of these statutes, Professor Koh demon-
strates that they have failed miserably in restoring the balance between
the branches. Two key problems have been the lack of political will on
the part of Congress to enforce these reform measures and judicial tolera-
tion of executive adventurism. In a sense, the failure of Congress and the
judiciary to stem the tide of executive overreaching is a failure to be truly
committed to our constitutional scheme of balanced participation, a fail-
ure that at an extreme would render law meaningless. 21
For example, Congress in 1977 sought to curb executive emergency
power by providing that future Congresses shall meet to consider a vote
on a joint resolution to terminate Presidential emergency proclamations
within six months of their promulgation.22 Congress has never followed
this. provision and the courts have held it to be unenforceable. 23 One
now questions if this provision of law has any legal meaning. Similarly,
the judicial failure to uphold constitutional principles in the area of for-
eign policy is a failure of constitutional commitment to challenge the
misuse of power.24 In a sense, it was a recognition of that failure of com-
mitment that led Justice Stewart to view the Supreme Court's refusal to
grapple with the constitutional implications of the Vietnam conflict as
the Court's greatest single failure during his tenure as a Justice.25
The National Security Constitution thus demonstrates that a growing
gap exists between constitutional doctrine and practice with respect to
the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process. For Koh, the Supreme
Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 26 is a
21. See, eg., Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreward: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HAiv. L. REv. 4, 44-45 (1983) (legal meaning depends on a commitment to live by one's
interpretation of the law). I am indebted to Susan Koniak for pointing out the role that com-
mitment plays in Robert Cover's thinking. See also H. KoH, supra note 2, at 184, and Cover,
supra, at nn. 114, 115 (role of judges).
22. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (1982); Na-
tional Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601,-§ 1622 (1982).
23. See Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan, 814 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1987).
24. See P. 184; Cover, supra note 21, at 58-60.
25. Tribe, Justice Stewart 4 Tale of Two Portraits, 95 YALE L. J. 1328, 1331 (1986).
26. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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landmark decision in expressing the constitutional vision of balanced in-
stitutional participation. That vision is challenged by Justice Suther-
land's dicta in his 1936 opinion, United States v. Curtiss-Wright, where
he stated that the President is the "sole organ" of foreign affairs. 27 But
Professor Koh argues that "[a]s a strict matter of constitutional law, ...
Curtiss-Wright has only challenged, not displaced, the prevailing consti-
tutional vision of a shared power in foreign affairs.
' '28
I would go even further than Koh. While I am unsure what is a
"strict" matter of constitutional law, Curtiss- Wright certainly has dis-
placed Youngstown in executive branch theory.29 But more importantly,
Koh decisively demonstrates that both Congress and the judiciary have
essentially acquiesced in executive branch unilateral decision making in
the area of foreign affairs. For example, there was virtually no dissent in
Congress this past winter when the Bush Administration unilaterally de-
cided to invade Panama. Koh is so effective at demonstrating the con-
gressional and judicial reluctance to challenge executive dominance that
he undermines his argument that the Youngstown vision of shared power
is still predominant. From an empirical, legal realist conception of con-
stitutional law, rather than a prescriptive view, unilateral executive ac-
tion seems firmly established in constitutional practice.30 The Executive
acts, Congress acquiesces and the judiciary abstains. In such a circum-
stance, "the gloss which life has written"31 upon the text of the Constitu-
tion inevitably illuminates executive power.32
III. Substance and Process
Professor Koh accurately describes the constitutional problem in its
multitude of manifestations and draws each thread together in a coherent
whole. He provides us with the historical dimensions of the contempo-
27. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
28. P. 212.
29. Professor Casper has argued that a search of briefs on the constitutional allocation of
foreign affairs powers would probably show Curtiss-Wright, and not Youngstown, to be the
most frequently cited case on the subject. Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of
Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 463, 475 (1976).
30. See id. at 465.
31. The phrase is from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610.
32. Justices Jackson's and Frankfurter's concurrences in Youngstown are in the legal real-
ist tradition and therefore plant the seeds of the acceptance of executive dominance where, as
has been the case recently, Congress acquiesces. See Lobel, supra note 17, at 1409-12. Indeed,
as Koh points out, recent Supreme Court decisions such as Dames & Moore pay homage to
Youngstown at the same time as they use Youngstown to engrave executive dominance into our
constitutional landscape. For example, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, Justice Rehnquist relies
heavily on Jackson's and Frankfurter's concurrences to uphold executive power, arguing that
Congress implicitly consented to executive power to settle claims because of its long history of
acquiescence in such executive settlements. 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
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rary situation, as well as the connection between the constitutional issues
and U.S. foreign policy. The question remains, however, what to do
about the growing gap between doctrine and reality. It is here that Pro-
fessor Koh, as did Ely in Democracy & Distrust, turns to process as
prescription.
Professor Koh's solution to the problems he describes is to reinvigo-
rate the foreign policy processes. "[W]hat the Iran-contra affair actually
reveals is that our national security system is inadequately regulated.
'33
Congress must enact "framework legislation" and "a new national secur-
ity charter" to regulate and protect many aspects of the foreign policy
making process.
34
Professor Koh has a number of procedural suggestions, many of them
quite good. For example, he suggests improving internal accountability
within the executive branch by such mechanisms as making the Attorney
General a statutory member of the National Security Council. Koh con-
siders these principles a sort of" 'due process of foreign policy adminis-
tration,' parallel to those found in the Administrative Procedure Act."' 35
Similarly, Koh has suggestions for improving congressional oversight of
foreign policy, such as developing a core consultative group and making
more extensive use of "fast track" legislation. Finally, framework legis-
lation should remove many of the prudential obstacles to judicial review
of executive foreign policy actions.
Koh avoids substantive policy recommendations in favor of sugges-
tions for procedural reforms. Eschewing Yogi Berra's wonderfully inane
substantive recommendation to avoid close plays at first base by moving
the base closer to home, Koh would instead "reinvolve the first baseman
and the umpire in the game."3 6 For Koh, the Iran-Contra scandal funda-
mentally revealed the "defects in ourprocess of national security decision
making."'37 A new national security charter will succeed in restraining
executive adventurism because "it imposes no substantive view, but rather
embodies a procedural notion that already lies at the heart of our Na-
tional Security Constitution - the principle of balanced institutional
participation. '3
8
33. P. 3 (emphasis in original).
34. Framework legislation is a "quasi-constitutional variety of congressional action, de-
lineating not substantive policy, but processes and relationships." G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 429 n.3 (9th ed. 1975), cited in Casper, supra note 29,
at 482 n.69.
35. P. 110; see also. P. 114 (Iran-Contra violated the legal principles that make up the due
process of foreign policy administration).
36. P. 204 (emphasis in original).
37. P. 226 (emphasis in original).
38. P. 226 (emphasis both added and in the original).
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Professor Koh's perspective resonates with the words of Ely's monu-
mental work on judicial review, published a decade earlier. Ely sought to
legitimate judicial review as a mechanism to police democratic processes
and not as a means to impose substantive values. He pointed out that the
Constitution is overwhelmingly "dedicated to concerns of process and
structure and not to the identification and preservation of specific sub-
stantive values."'39 He recognized that the Constitution has always been
substantively concerned with preserving liberty, but argued that it does
so by ensuring procedural protections and, more importantly, by pre-
scribing an open process for all to participate in making substantive deci-
sions. The Constitution is thus distinguished by being "a process of
government, not a governing ideology." 4 Quoting Justice Hans Linde,
Ely concludes that "as a charter of government a constitution must pre-
scribe legitimate processes, not legitimate outcomes. '41
These general principles lead Koh to recommend new legislation to
ensure that the foreign policy-making process is shared between the dif-
ferent branches of government. In Ely's terms, his argument is that "the
selection and accommodation of substantive values [in foreign policy] is
left almost entirely to the political process and instead the document is
overwhelmingly concerned... with ensuring broad participation in the
processes and distributions of government. '42 For Koh, this means en-
suring broad participation between the branches of government in the
making of foreign policy.43
Ely's book immediately caused widespread controversy and comment.
His effort to separate process from substance was criticized as fundamen-
tally misguided. Professor Tribe argued that "the Constitution may ap-
pear in large part to address the structure and arrangement of
government... but the concerns that underlie and explain the structures
and arrangements ordained by the Constitution are themselves undenia-
bly substantive." 44 For Tribe, there is no reason to believe that the
"framework" rules constituting our constitutional processes are, or can
be, neutral, with respect to underlying substantive values.
39. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 92.
40. Id. at 101.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 87.
43. Interestingly, Koh does not address the problem of the increasing distance between the
government as a whole and the citizenry in the conduct of foreign policy, a problem which is
connected to the increasing centralization of power in the executive branch.
44. Tribe, supra note 1, at 1066 n.9 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 1064, 1067-68.
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Professor Paul Brest also argued that one could not isolate constitu-
tional process from substantive decision making.45 Decisions about what
sorts of discrimination are unconstitutional and which are permissible
cannot be made simply by a process-oriented inquiry, but require value
judgments about what sort of "prejudice" is justifiable.46 Thus, accord-
ing to Brest, Ely's assumption that the Constitution manifests a clear
separation of substance from procedure is flawed. 47
Probably the best illustration of the relationship between substantive
values and fair and open procedures is to be found in Frank Michelman's
work on welfare rights.48 Michelman responded to criticism of his theory
that welfare rights could not be derived from the Constitution by invok-
ing Ely's process representation-reinforcing approach. Michelman ar-
gued that people are not able to participate in the political process when
they have nothing to eat, no education or no shelter. Therefore, a theory
of judicial review that eschews substantive values and focuses purely on
the goal of achieving an open and fair process requires the State to ensure
that citizens have at least the minimum wherewithal to participate in the
process. Michelman's clever approach simply illustrates the direct con-
nection between substantive values and procedural openness, for one
needs a certain degree of substantive liberty in order to be able to utilize
the representative process. How much and what kinds of liberty require
substantive choices.
The debate over Ely's book is clearly instructive in the foreign policy
arena. Professor Koh's attempt to separate process from substance and
to address only the procedural aspects of our constitutional crisis in for-
eign affairs is problematic for two basic reasons. First, as Koh himself
suggests, it is theoretically impossible to divide process from substance.
Indeed, one of the book's strengths is that it discusses constitutional
structures in relation to the international context of U.S. foreign policy.
Second, such a separation will not work practically. Why should Koh's
solution of more and better legal regulation work any better now than it
did in the 1970s when a similar approach was tried and failed?
Professor Tribe's general observation, that the processes and structures
of government are intertwined with and reflect substantive goals and val-
ues, accurately describes the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitu-
tion. The war powers provisions of the Constitution reflect 18th-century
Republican ideology that rejected extreme pacifism, but limited the use
45. Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 131, 140 (1981).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WAsH. U. L.Q. 659.
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of force to defensive actions. Therefore, the Constitution gave the federal
government the power to raise armies and navies and to use force against
other nations, yet attempted to circumscribe such uses by structural
mechanisms. The framers sought to ensure popular control over the Ex-
ecutive's resort to force, accepting a basic Republican premise that mon-
archy was the source of warfare.49
Similarly, the constitutional provision requiring the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the Senate before a treaty could be ratified promoted the
substantive goal of avoiding entangling alliances with European powers.
Finally, the constitutional provision providing that treaties would be a
part of the supreme law of the land was designed to promote the policy
goal of ensuring that the United States would comply with its interna-
tional obligations. 50 As one recent scholar has noted, "[the foreign pol-
icy] provisions of the Constitution meant more than structure. [They]
expressed the political and social ideology of the Revolutionary
Leaders." 51
The separation of powers provisions thus served two basic purposes.
The first was to promote the democratic value of ensuring that major
foreign policy decisions would not be made by one person alone, but
would require "the assent of other independent minds."'52 Yet probably
more important were the instrumental values sought to be achieved by
shared decision-making. To a militarily weak America, constitutional
separation of powers was a procedural device designed to achieve the
substantive goal of limiting the use of American troops abroad. This
cautious U.S. foreign policy was reflected in a constitutional structure
that made military and political adventurism difficult. Thomas Jefferson
desired an "effectual check to the Dog of War"; James Wilson of Penn-
sylvania argued that the Constitution was designed not to "hurry us into
war"; while Representative George Mason of Virginia stated that the
Convention should be "clogging rather than facilitating war."'53 The fact
49. R. STUART, WAR AND AMERICAN THOUGHT: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
MONROE DOCTRINE 36 (1982); M. HowARD, WAR AND THE LIBERAL CONSCIENcE 25
(1978) (Liberal philosophers of the 18th century assumed that "peace and moderation are the
spirit of a republic") (quoting Montesquieu). Tucker & Hendrickson, Thomas Jefferson and
American Foreign Policy, FOREIGN Am'., Spring 1990, at 135, 137-38.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 437 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
51. R. STUART, supra note 49, at 66.
52. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1512
(5th ed. 1901). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
53. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1951); 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528
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that Congress, not the President, was given the power to commit the
nation to armed conflict, represented a substantive judgment on the part
of the framers that entry of American troops into armed conflict abroad
should be difficult. As James Madison noted, "[t]he Constitution sup-
poses... that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of power most interested in
war and most prone to it. It has accordingly[,] with studied care, vested
the question of war in the legis[lature]. ' 54 Congress, as the more cum-
bersome and popular branch, would presumably move more slowly and
cheek what was believed to be the Executive's tendency to resort to
force.55 That substantive judgment was conditioned on both general
principle and the historical circumstances in which the leaders of the
Republic found themselves.
Professor Koh's view that the principle of shared decision making in
the area of foreign policy "imposes no substantive view" is untenable, at
least when one defines "substantive view" broadly. While it may be true
that a process approach does not yield a substantive outcome in any par-
ticular foreign policy dispute, the approach is certainly linked to a sub-
stantive policy framework.5 6 Indeed, Professor Koh recognizes that
unilateral American action abroad is tied to executive constitutional uni-
lateralism, and that a policy of multilateral international cooperation is
consistent with shared constitutional decision making.57 But if that is the
case, how can process be separated from substance, how is it possible that
Koh's process vision is substantively neutral?
One might argue that even if substantive goals were linked to struc-
tural reforms, the way to begin is to reform the process. A process-ori-
ented approach would not, under this view, be an end in itself, but simply
the first step in redefining both the structure and substance of American
foreign policy. The trouble with this approach is that it in essence is the
same approach that was tried in the 1970s and failed.
54. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
55. Professor Koh's separation of process and substance leads to problems with.his specific
reform suggestions. As David Cole has pointed out, a number of Koh's procedural suggestions
such as developing a core consultative group within Congress to share in foreign policy deci-
sion making "[makes] Congress look and act more like the President." Cole, Youngstown v.
Curtiss-Wright, 99 YALE L.J. 2065, 2076 (1990). In reinvolving Congress in an efficient, cen-
tralized fashion, Koh ignores the substantive values to be served by a cumbersome, deliberative
and representative body that would hinder the use of American forces abroad.
56. See Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
343, 347-48 ("we tend to examine structural issues as if they involved only debates about
neutral framework principles that are unconnected to fluctuating substantive policy debates");
see generally Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to
The Formalists, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 (1989); Lobel, supra note 17; M. HUNT, IDEOLOGY
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1987).
57. P. 216.
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The aftermath of the Vietnam War brought a host of process-oriented,
framework reforms. But, despite a brief period of soul-searching in the
1970s, the United States never fundamentally redefined its aggressive,
imperial vision of its role in world affairs. As Henry Steele Commager
noted in reflecting upon the Vietnam War, the "abuse of executive power
cannot be separated from abuse of national power. If we subvert world
order and destroy world peace, we must inevitably subvert and destroy
our own political institutions first."' 58 Therefore, he wisely recommended
that the answer to the abuse of executive power lies in the dissipation of
the "forces, motives and fears which underlie the exercise and the ration-
ale of excessive presidential power."' 59 Post-Vietnam America never seri-
ously addressed those "forces, motives and fears," and therefore the best
intentioned reforms are now, twenty years later, conceded to be failures.
The futility of proceeding with framework legislation in the absence of
a substantive change in policy direction can be seen in Koh's book itself.
Professor Koh recognizes that "there is no current shortage of legislative
proposals [designed to reform our foreign policy-making process], only of
congressional will to act upon them."' 6 The key reason that Congress
refuses to enact such legislation is that most Congresspersons share the
perspective that modem U.S. foreign policy interests require a President
who can intervene forcefully around the globe and not be tied down by
constitutional restrictions. U.S. actions such as kidnapping suspected
criminals abroad, invading other nations to capture suspected drug oper-
ators, aiding in the assassination of foreign leaders, and using military
force to.wage the war against drugs abroad are increasingly accepted by
all branches of government. All these actions further reinforce executive
dominance over foreign policy. The congressional will to enact frame-
work legislation requires redefining U.S. foreign policy to promote multi-
lateral cooperation instead of unilateral adventurism.
Similarly, the judiciary is willing to distort constitutional principles
and statutory interpretation because it fears restraining the Executive's
functioning in a dangerous world. For example, just this past term the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a
search by U.S. agents of a non-resident alien. 61 The case was decided
against the background of the Panama invasion and Manuel Noriega's
capture, with his subsequent removal to the United States for trial. Chief
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that
58. H. COMMAGER, THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA 58 (1968).
59. Id. at 57.
60. P. 187.
61. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
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For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which- our
Government must be able to 'functio[n] effectively in the company of sover-
eign nations.' [cite omitted] Some who violate our laws may live outside
our borders under a regime quite different from that which obtains in this
country. Situations threatening to important American interests may arise
half-way around the globe, situations which in the view of the political
branches of our Government require an American response with armed
.force. If there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur
incident to such American action, they must be imposed by the political
branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.62
Examples of nations reforming their constitutional processes illustrate
the relationship between procedural reforms and substantive changes in
foreign policy. In the United States, the "process" reforms of the 1970s,
while ultimately unsuccessful, reflected the nation's revulsion at the Viet-
nam War and a desire to limit our role as the world's policeman. Unfor-
tunately, this substantive retrenchment was short-lived and did not
survive the 1970s.
Similarly, the Soviet Union now is attempting to apply separation of
powers principles to foreign policy decision making, an effort that reflects
Soviet caution about military intervention around the world. While
Gorbachev's ascension to the Soviet Presidency in March 1990 occa-
sioned a dramatic increase in his domestic powers at the expense of the
Communist party apparatus, he, at the same time, recognized the consti-
tutional principles of shared power in certain key areas of foreign policy.
President Gorbachev expressly committed himself to refrain from using
armed force outside the country without approval from the Soviet Legis-
lature.63 He would depart from this otherwise categorical rule only to
defend the country from a surprise armed attack.
It is no accident that President Gorbachev's acceptance of procedural
restraints on his Commander-in-Chief powers coincides with Soviet mili-
tary retrenchment and renewed interest in multilateral co-operation.
While clearly the internal dynamics of Soviet politics are different from
ours, Gorbachev's verbal embrace of the principle contained in Article I
§ 8 of our Constitution at a time when our President refuses to even rhe-
torically accept that principle emphasizes the relationship between pro-
cess and substance. Gorbachev's new thinking on international relations
allows him to accept certain separation of powers restraints, albeit in the
context of continued dominance by one party. Our lack of new thinking
62. Id. at 1066.
63. Excerpts from Gorbachev Speech on Presidency, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1990, at A6, col.
3.
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permits us to view Iran-Contra as an isolated incident and to continue
our de facto reliance on executive assertiveness.
Learned Hand once admonished that "a society so riven that the spirit
of moderation is gone, no court can save." 4 While I am not as mistrust-
ful of courts as was Judge Hand, and agree with many of Professor Koh's
views on reinvigorating the judiciary's role in foreign policy disputes,
there is a certain basic truth to Hand's remark. To rephrase it, "in a
society so riven with the quest for world dominance that it must con-
stantly intervene around the globe, procedural reform simply will not be
able to resuscitate separation of powers in foreign policy." Framework
legislation will .certainly play a role in reinvigorating our democratic
processes, but only insofar as it proceeds apace with a dramatically trans-
formed vision of America's role in the world.
Professor Koh analogizes the relationship between the branches to
that of a marriage, arguing that "Dust] as one spouse cannot and should
not win in a marriage, one branch of government cannot and should not
permanently defeat another. ' 65 To carry the analogy further, a marriage
is based not merely on a commitment to a fair decision-making process,
but to certain substantive values. Some substantive values, such as the
value of eradicating male chauvinism, further equality in decision mak-
ing while others do not. To repair a relationship gone sour would seem
to require not merely a recommitment to process, but an inquiry into the
substantive values which make the marriage work or fail.
IV. Foreign Policy in the 1990s
For the first time in forty years, the international situation presents an
opportunity for a dramatic transformation in the overall direction of U.S.
foreign policy.66 If the United States can grasp that opportunity and
chart a new course, we could revitalize our own constitutional processes
and structures and aceept the principle of shared institutional power over
foreign policy.
64. Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization (1944), in TiE
SPmrr oF LIBERTY 155, 164 (I. Dillar ed. 1960).
65. P. 153.
66. Commentators from various political perspectives have recognized that the 1990s pres-
ent an opportunity for rethinking American foreign policy. Hoffman, What Should We Do in
the World, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1989, at 84 ("one of those periods, which obliges the
United States to rethink its role in the world"); Kristol, The Map of the World Has Changed,
Wall Street J., Jan. 3, 1990, at A6, col. 3 (we need "new, imaginative thinking about America's
role in this world"); Maynes, America Without the Cold War, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1990, at
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The United States and the international community face decisive
choices in the 1990s. The convergence of the decline of America's eco-
nomic dominance, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of world-
wide environmental and economic problems present opportunities for a
"Grotian" transformation in international relations, comparable to the
development of the present nation-state system in the 16th and 17th
centuries. 67
The choice facing U.S. policy is not simply one of internationalism
versus isolationism, activism versus passivity. It is fundamentally a task
of redefining our internationalism and redirecting our activism. Our in-
ternationalism of the past forty years has been directed to maintaining
U.S. hegemony and dominance over the globe. Our activism was that of
an overzealous policeman, actively intervening militarily and economi-
cally in other nations' affairs to ensure stability and to remove threats to
U.S. interests. The task for the 1990s will be to develop an international-
ism based on multilateral co-operation and not unilaterialism, to reorient
our activism towards such projects as protecting the world's environment
or eradicating hunger.
Since World War II, the Cold War and fear of world communism pro-
vided the underlying logic driving American foreign policy.68 The period
of our greatest power was paradoxically perceived by Americans as being
one of our greatest insecurity. The development of nuclear weapons
brought about a pervasive anxiety about our national survival.6 9 Our
foreign policy was guided by the imagery of national survival, exempli-
fied by Oliver North's justification of his actions: "[T]his nation is at risk
in a dangerous world."' 7° A crisis mentality underlay American foreign
policy, a mentality that perceived enemies around the world constantly
seeking to undermine our society.
71
This crisis perspective aided American dominance and hegemony as it
provided a convenient rationale justifying American intervention around
the world.72 Expansionism was conducted under the banner of contain-
67. Falk, Some Thoughts on the Decline of International Law and Future Prospects, 9 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 399, 408-09 (1980). See also INTERNATiONAL LAW, A CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTrVE 7 (R. Falk, F. Kratocwhil & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1985) (describing Grotian moment
in history).
68. Maynes, supra note 66, at 5, 8.
69. R. MAY, THE MEANING oF ANXmTY 12 (1977).
70. Joint Hearings Before the House Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions
With Iran and the Senate Select Comm on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicara-
guan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987) (testimony of 0. North, July 7, 1987).
71. See Lobel, supra note 17, at 1400-03.
72. For example, the sense of crisis was used to justify Reagan era interventionism. Paul
Nitze wrote shortly before Reagan's 1980 victory that the situation was "the gravest that the
United States and the West have faced at least since the Soviet threat to Berlin in 1958-1962
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ment.73 As Arthur Schlesinger noted, the American state of mind coin-
cided with that of the Roman Empire:
There was no comer of the known world where some interest was not al-
leged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Ro-
man, they were those of Rome's allies; and if Rome had no allies, then allies
would be invented .... Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded
neighbors, always fighting for breathing space.74
The end of the Cold War has removed the main military crisis ration-
ale from U.S. policy. The decline of U.S. economic domination has
forced policy makers to grope for new policies. The threat of world wide
environmental catastrophe has led to a search for new strategies. In each
of these areas American policy is basically adrift, searching for a foreign
policy to meet the challenges of the 1990s. 75 In this situation a funda-
mental transformation of U.S. foreign policy is both necessary and con-
ceivable. Such a transformation would inevitably bring in its wake much
of the framework legislation that Professor Koh urges.
There are four basic directions that American foreign policy can take
in the 1990s.76 The first is to continue the same basic policies of interven-
tionism around the world. Indeed, United States policy makers may sim-
ply view Soviet restraint as an opportunity to more freely intervene in
Third World conflicts. We appear poised to locate new enemies, be they
drug dealers, terrorists, dictators, foreign competitors, nationalist revolu-
tionaries, in order to rationalize continued military intervention abroad.
In seeking continued high levels of defense spending, President Bush re-
cently urged a policy outline for the future to combat "'new threats'
such as terrorism and drugs, rather than the 'traditional East-West an-
tagonism of the last 45 years.'"77 The President warned that we could
and possibly at any time since the end of World War II." Quoted in Hyland, Setting Global
Priorities, FOREIGN PoL'y, Winter 1988-89, at 22, 24.
73. Justice William 0. Douglas once noted that "subconsciously we are not reacting to
external threats but to a desire to extend our own economic realm and our political zones of
action." W. DOUGLAS, INTERNATIONAL DISSENT: Six STEPS TOWARD WORLD PEACE 47
(1971); see also N. CHOMSKY, TURNING THE TIDE 66-72, 85-89 (1985) (describing United
States view that we are "a pitiful, helpless, giant" as a mechanism "undoubtedly believed at
some level of consciousness," but cynically invoked to justify intervention abroad).
74. A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1984 (1973), quoting A. SCHUMPTER,
IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL CLASSES 51 (1955).
75. Maynes, supra note 66; Tonelson, While the World Erupts, U.S. Policy Stands Still,
L.A. Times, June 11, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 4; Friedman, As Ideology Recedes, The US. Rear-
ranges its Global Struggle, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1989, at E2, col. 4.
76. These choices I propose are somewhat different, but follow the basic outline of the
positions articulated by Charles Maynes, supra note 66.
77. Lauter, Bush Defends His Policies on Eastern Europe, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at A3,
col. 4. General John T. Chain also asserted that even the Pentagon's proposed 5 year defense
plan projecting a mere 2% annual reduction, "could cost the United States its status as a
superpower." Healy, Military Spending Cuts Could Cost US. 'Superpower Status" SAC Chief
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not "let down our guard against a worldwide threat. ' 78 Others, such as
former Army Chief of Staff E.C. Meyer, have suggested-that a united
Germany and a militarized Japan will become "[t]he two biggest threats"
when the Cold War is over.79 "Nations need enemies," states neo-con-
servative commentator Charles Krauthammer. "Take away one and
they find another... [p]arties and countries need mobilizing symbols of
'otherness' to energize the nation and to give it purpose." 80
Apart from locating new enemies, a second variant of the intervention-
ism theme is a renewed and more vigorous crusade to proscribe democ-
racy around the world. For example, Senators Richard Lugar and
Nancy Kassenbaum both argue that our main foreign policy task for the
1990s is to ensure the growth of worldwide democracy. 81 As Senator
Kassenbaum noted, while in the post-World War II world our greatest
challenge was containing the spread of communism, now our task is
more affirmative, to create and nurture democracy.
The crusade for democracy has a universalist, internationalist and ulti-
mately interventionist underpinning. Preserving democracy has always
been a favorite justification for intervening to overthrow governments we
do not like.8 2 Institutions such as the National Endowment for Democ-
racy are playing an increasingly interventionist role in the election cam-
paigus of other nations. While the crusade for democracy may change
the imagery and rhetoric from the old crusade against communism, at
bottom it still seeks to remake the world in America's image.
A third possible perspective for the 1990s is that of an increasing focus
on domestic problems and a retreat from the internationalism that has
driven American foreign policy for the past half century. Our nation has
emerged victorious from the Cold War, but is one of only two industrial-
Warns, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 1990, at A24, col. 1. Michael Klare has contended that as early
as the mid-1980s, military strategists were arguing that the U.S. should reorient its forces from
Europe to be able to fight wars in the Third World. Klare, Stopping the War Against the Third
World, THE PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1989, at 14, 16. A recent example of the continued interven-
tionist policies against perceived third world enemies is the Bush Administration's decision to
develop a large new military. aid program to fight leftist guerrillas in Peru. Brooke, US. Will
Arm Peru to Fight Leftists-in New Drug Push, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 8.
78. Rosenthal, A War is Fought As Bush Looks On, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1990, at A13, col.
1.
79. Maynes, supra note 66, at 12.
80. Krauthammer, Beyond the Cold War, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1988, at 14, 18.
81. Kassenbaum, American Foreign Policy in the 1990s, 10 SCH. ADV. IN'L. STUD. REV.
32 (Winter-Spring 1990); Lugar, id. at 34.
82. There is also often an explicit connection between the campaigu for democracy and
American militarism. Ben Wattenberg, Chairman of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority,
has argued that "embarking on a crusade for democracy can help persuade the American
people to keep defense budgets high 'to prevent Soviet imperial recidivism.'" Maynes, supra
note 66, at 14.
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ized nations that does not provide health care insurance for all its citizens
(the other being South Africa), 83 and ranks nearly last among industrial-
ized nations in infant mortality.84 Children in the United States are more
likely to die before their first birthday or live in poverty than children in
11 other industrialized nations8 5 Some 20 million Americans go hungry
sometime each month, and between 600,000 and 1.2 million are home-
less. 86 It is therefore understandable that many Americans wish to redi-
rect our energies to domestic needs. Some commentators have argued
that "[t]he main threats to our international position are domestic in
kind," and that therefore we must redirect our energies to rebuilding our
economy and infrastructure and attending to human needs at home
8 7
From this perspective, the main focus for the future ought not to be on
extending democracy abroad, but on providing equality here at home.
While refocusing our attention to domestic needs would certainly be
welcome, the United States is and will continue to be a major interna-
tional actor. A retreat into pre-World War II isolationism is simply im-
possible. Thus, the fourth alternative is for United States policy to shift
to a new type of internationalism from than that which it has practiced
for the past century. It would be an internationalism based more
strongly on multilateral cooperation, international law and respect for
the sovereignty of other nations. We ought to renounce the practice of
unilaterally invading other nations to overthrow governments, or to kid-
nap suspected criminals abroad, or to assassinate or aid in the assassina-
tion of foreign leaders. We should recognize that a respect for
international law requires accepting World Court decisions even where,
as in the Nicaragua case, the Court rules against us. We ought to initiate
multilateral efforts to protect the world's environment, instead of unilat-
erally opposing agreements made by other industrial nations because of
our view that such environmental agreements "impose a system of global
management." 88
83. Lewis, But We Close Our Eyes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1990, at A21, col. 5.
84. See Rosenblatt, Coming to America, LIVE, Feb. 1990, at 40, 42; Beatty, A Post Cold
War Budget, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1990, at 74.
85. Coe, Report: Child Care, Health Log in U.S., Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Mar. 19, 1990,
at 3, col. 1.
86. Rosenblatt, supra note 84, at 44.
87. Beatty, supra note 84, at 74.
88. Shabecoff, U.S. Is Assailed At Geneva Talks For Backing Out of Ozone Plan, N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1990, at Al, col. 1. In what was termed "a major embarrassment for the
United States," the Bush Administration opposed setting up a fund to help poor countries
adhere to phase out chemicals that are destroying the Earth's ozone layer. The fund had been
agreed to by all the other major industrialized countries. Richard Darman, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, "assailed 'radical Greens,' for seeking to impose a system
of 'global management' to protect the environment." Id. at A6, col. 2.
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The debate over foreign policy is therefore not between international-
ism versus isolationism, as various commentators suggest.89 It is between
two different concepts of internationalism. Whereas the present form of
internationalism practiced by the United States seeks to dominate other
nations, a new form would attempt to live cooperatively with them in an
interdependent world. Recognizing the limits of our power does not
mean withdrawing from the international arena, just entering it with a
new approach.
Therefore, Professor Koh's criticism of those on the left who would
have the United States "simply renounce activism in an international re-
gime" 90 misses the point. It is not United States activism that is at issue;
rather, it is the substantive nature of that activism. Broad terms like
activism, globalism, and internationalism, can serve to obscure concrete
policy choices. I would like to see the United States be more active in
developing a multilateral approach to the serious environmental
problems afflicting the world. I would urge more action on resolving the
debt crisis affecting third world nations and on combatting world hunger.
I urge a United States more actively committed to international institu-
tions such as the World Court. I object, however, to certain types of
activities such as military intervention abroad, while not to the concept
of activism itself. Gorbachev's foreign policy has certainly been an ac-
tivist one, probably more activist than Bush's. It has simply been more
activist in promoting international law and self-determination for foreign
nations than either Brezhnev's or Bush's. Our constitutional separation
of powers is not undermined by internationalism or globalism per se, but
by the drive for domination over the globe, by hegemony or imperialism.
While clearly each of the four directions will be present in American
foreign policy of the 1990s, the question is which one will predominate.
The path I would choose would mean both refocusing on domestic needs
and changing the nature of our activism abroad to a more multilateral,
less aggressive approach. The conjuncture in world politics today of the
end of the Cold War and our own declining economic dominance pro-
vides a virtually unique possibility for choosing to resolve the tension
between empire and republicanism that has been present since our coun-
try's founding.91 We can respond to our own and the Soviet Union's
89. Weinberger, National Defense in the Next Decade, in THINKING ABOUT AMERiCA,
THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990s 165, 166-67 (A. Anderson & D. Bark eds. 1988); F. Lewis,
On or Off the World, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
90. P. 225.
91. W. LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE (1989) (describing the tendency to expansionism
in American history); M. HUNT, supra note 56; W. WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE
(1980).
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decline by choosing to do what many great powers have done in the past
- becoming more assertive about our national security and "spending
more on security, thereby diverting potential resources from investment
and compounding [the] long-term domestic dilemma." 92 Or we can rec-
ognize both the limits of our power and the opportunity to help develop a
more just world order in which we would live among other nations in-
stead of lording over them.
Choosing the latter alternative would have several long-term effects on
our constitutional foreign policy framework. First, it would create the
climate for enacting much of the framework legislation that Professor
Koh advocates. Removing the crisis mentality of American policy would
free the body politic from the dogma that the President must have maxi-
mum flexibility and autonomy to act in international affairs. Secondly,
the restoration of a more "republican" vision of foreign policy that views
America as "a model, not a molder, ' 93 would involve reviving communi-
tarian politics. The citizenry, often acting through local communities,
would play a more active role in determining our relations with people of
other nations. Some commentators have even suggested national refer-
enda on foreign affairs issues.94
Such a Republican revival of communitarian politics is already occur-
ring to some extent. Localities have passed resolutions on foreign policy
issues and have adopted sister cities in other parts of the world, 95 and
citizens across the country have engaged in acts of civil disobedience to
protest certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy.9 6 While still nascent, these
trends offer some hope of transforming the "managerial globalism of in-
ternational banks and multinational corporations" to a democratic
globalism from below that "joins peoples across borders, regions, and
cultures."' 97 To Koh's "balanced institutional participation," therefore,
must be added this concept of informed "civic participation" in foreign
policy making.
92. Kennedy, The (Relative) Decline ofAmerica, ATLANrc MONTHLY, Aug. 1987, at 34,
quoted in W. LAFEBER, supra note 91, at 675.
93. See M. HUNT, supra note 56, at 192-96. The alternative I present here has certain
aspects of what Hunt terms "Republicanism" in that it does seek to focus more on our internal
needs, and not remake the world in our image. But, in today's context, Republicanism is not
isolationism, but a redefined activism in the world.
94. Tonelson, Foreign Policy By Referendum, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1990, at A15, col. 1.
95. Sherman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Winter 1987,
at 154.
96. See Falk, Introduction, in F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESSTANCE UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1987).
97. Falk, A Brand New Kind of Politics, TH E PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1990, at 20. Falk argues
that in effect, the 1980s reestablished the revolutionary role of the people in the great classical
tradition of popular sovereignty.
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Finally, following the substantive suggestions presented here would al-
low us to change the way we think about the foreign policy provisions of
our Constitution. At present, we speak of a National Security Constitu-
tion. By using that terminology, we immediately substantively charac-
terize our Constitution in a negative, defensive posture. Would it not be
better in the future if we could refer to this constitutional framework as
our Peace Constitution, or International Order Constitution, or (more
neutrally) our International Affairs Constitution? But to do so would
require us to change our pattern of thinking and established dogma, to
view foreign policy not primarily as defending our country from real or
imagined enemies abroad, but as providing a framework for living in a
just international order.
V. Conclusion
Larry Tribe, in his essay of 1980, viewed the continued insistence on
process-based constitutional theories as puzzling.98 In one sense, it is
puzzling that scholars persist in the effort to undertake better and more
comprehensive procedural reform despite the lessons of the failure of the
post-Vietnam War reform movement. Why should this effort turn out
any better than the last? Indeed, if the response to Iran-Contra is any
indication, it appears that any new round of procedural reform will be
even weaker than the post-Vietnam reforms.
Yet from another perspective, the continued focus on process is not
puzzling at all. Process-based theories seek to solve hard problems-with-
out the necessity of making difficult substantive choices.. In The National
Security Constitution, this means attempting to fix the process without
dealing with the hard policy choices that lie behind the ruptured
processes. The problem is that in constitutional law, as in life, there is no
such thing as a free ride, and it is impossible to ignore the difficult
choices that lie before us. My hunch is that as to those substantive policy
choices Professor Koh and I would generally agree, and that if he ad-
dressed them, his insights would be as perceptive and articulate as are his
perceptions on the processes of government contained in this book.
98. Tribe, supra note 1.
